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The Campaign Against Double Taxation *
By Ralph Coughenour Jones

The serious discussion of double taxation, according to Pro
fessor Seligman, began early in the thirteenth century. In recent
years, however, interest in the subject has become intensified, not
because modem tax laws are more unjust and conflicting than
the laws of earlier times, but because the rapid extension of busi
ness enterprises across the boundaries of states has created new
opportunities for double taxation and made the burden more
onerous. Double taxation will probably persist to a greater or
less extent so long as we have economic interdependence on the
one hand and a multiplicity of governmental units with their
large spending programs on the other. So complicated are the
problems to be solved that seven centuries more in the campaign
against double taxation may still fail to bring complete success.
If the prospects of eliminating double taxation are so remote,
one may well ask whether the attempt is worth while. It is clear,
however, that the campaign must continue unabated if the
burden is to be reduced or even prevented from increasing. The
situation reminds one of the scene in Alice in Wonderland, where
Alice, panting a little, says to the Red Queen: “Well, in our coun
try, you’d generally get to somewhere else—if you ran very fast
for a long time as we have been doing.” And the Red Queen
replies: “A slow sort of country! Now, here, you see, it takes all
the running you can do to keep in the same place.” In the face
of a rising tide of taxation it will be no mean achievement merely
to prevent an increase in double taxation. It is not a “slow sort
of country” in which we live. All governmental units, large and
small, are searching for new sources of revenue to help balance
tottering budgets, and a rabid nationalism is rampant throughout
the world. Only the utmost vigilance can prevent the appear
ance of new instances of double or multiple taxation.
Before proceeding further it may be well to pause for a moment
to consider the meaning of the term ‘‘ double taxation. ’’ ‘‘ Double
taxation in the simplest sense,” according to Professor Seligman,
“denotes the taxation of the same person or the same thing twice
over.” (Essays in Taxation, 10th edition, New York, 1928, p.
* An address delivered at the annual meeting of the Rhode Island Society of Certified Public
Accountants, Providence, R. I., April 17, 1934.
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98.) This definition admittedly is too broad. Professor Fred R.
Fairchild of Yale University has formulated a definition which
corresponds more closely to accepted usage. “Double taxation,”
he says, “is the imposition of the same tax upon the same object
twice during the same fiscal period by the same jurisdiction or by
coordinate jurisdictions.” There can be no doubt that anything
which comes within the limits of this definition is double taxation,
and there can be little doubt that it is unjust and discriminatory.
Note that according to this definition double taxation does not
occur when both a state and the federal government levy a tax
upon the same income. Here the jurisdictions are not coordinate.
The search for an exact definition, however, is difficult and per
haps unnecessary. Double taxation in this paper will be used in
the sense of Professor Fairchild’s definition. It is this type of
double taxation which we are seeking to eliminate. Though double
taxation occurs in many forms, I shall devote attention chiefly
to the problem as it arises in the taxation of business income.
The need for constant vigilance to prevent the increase of
double taxation was well illustrated during the consideration of the
revenue bill of 1934. In at least three sections, the bill as adopted
by the house of representatives provided new forms of double
taxation. Section 131 arbitrarily reduced by one half the credit
for taxes paid abroad; section 403 imposed upon American citizens
resident abroad the full federal estate tax on all property, real as
well as personal, wherever situated; and section 104 authorized
the president, in certain circumstances, to double the taxes of each
citizen and corporation of a foreign country. Strong protests by
the committee on double taxation of the American section of the
International Chamber of Commerce, the treasury department
and others led to the adoption of amendments correcting the
worst features of sections 131 and 403 of the house bill, but section
104 remained essentially unchanged.
The credit for foreign taxes is necessary in the United States as
a measure of partial relief from the double taxation which would
otherwise result from the inconsistency of taxing at the same time
all income having its origin in the United States and all the income
of American citizens, residents and corporations, regardless of
origin. It would be better in many ways to avoid double taxa
tion by exempting all income, or at least all business income,
having its origin in another country, but such a move might not
be feasible politically. The present provision, however, is wrong
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psychologically in that it creates the impression that the govern
ment is granting a special favor to certain taxpayers who are
generally assumed to be large corporations. The opposite, of
course, is true. It is no special favor to receive a credit against a
tax which should never have been levied, particularly when the
credit under certain conditions is less than the tax on the income
earned abroad. The assumption that the credit is primarily
beneficial to large corporations is also of doubtful validity. Such
corporations usually derive a relatively small proportion of their
total income from foreign sources and they are, as a rule, in the
best position to avoid a double tax by means of subsidiary com
panies or other devices. Companies of moderate size engaged
principally in international trade would be more apt to suffer
heavily from the elimination of the credit.
In any event, the elimination of the credit would simply add
another impediment to the revival of foreign trade, with little, if
any, increase in revenue. The action of the house in seeking to
reduce the credit by one half was obviously an illogical com
promise. It recognized the principle and at the same time
denied its application. The full credit was continued in the
revenue act of 1934, but the struggle to prevent its emasculation
will undoubtedly have to be resumed when future revenue bills are
under consideration.
The amendments to the estate tax, section 403 of the house bill,
constituted deliberate double and probably confiscatory taxation
of the estates of decedent citizens resident abroad, possibly with
the intention of punishing expatriates. These amendments vio
lated the generally accepted rule that the country in which a
person has his residence is entitled to tax the entire estate, except
real property situated elsewhere. They violated also the almost
universal rule that real estate is taxable only in the country in
which it is situated. Section 404 of the act as finally adopted,
however, does exclude real estate situated abroad from the gross
estate of decedents, but apparently in the case of non-resident
citizens the full estate tax must be paid on other property situated
abroad.
With respect to section 104 of the bill, the following recom
mendation was made:
“The committee on double taxation of the American section of
the International Chamber of Commerce recommends that if
section 104 of the bill is to be adopted, it should be amended so as
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to cover the matter of allocation of income and also to permit the
executive branch of the government to enter into agreements with
foreign countries looking toward the elimination of discriminatory
taxes and providing for equitable methods of allocating income
for the purpose of taxation among the several countries in which
the activities occur.”

Section 104 of the bill became section 103 of the act, but the
spirit remained the same. Section 103 provides, in part, that
“whenever the president finds that, under the laws of any foreign
country, citizens or corporations of the United States are being
subjected to discriminatory or extraterritorial taxes, the president
shall so proclaim and the rates of tax imposed . . . shall, for the
taxable year during which such proclamation is made and for
each taxable year thereafter, be doubled in the case of each citizen
and corporation of such foreign country. ...” This section is,
of course, designed to protect American interests, but even the
most elementary knowledge of human nature suggests that it is
much more apt to evoke retaliation than cooperation. A real
advance in reducing double taxation could have been made,
however, if the president had been given the power to make
reciprocal agreements with other nations as well as to threaten
them. If the president is to have the power to punish discrimi
nation by other countries, he should, it would seem, be given the
power to remove any discrimination against their nationals which
may appear in our own law. He is now in the anomalous position
of being able to punish others for abuses which he is unable to
remove from the laws of his own country.
The reference to agreements with foreign countries arises no
doubt from the interest of the International Chamber of Com
merce in the efforts of the League of Nations to reduce or elimi
nate double taxation. It was the international chamber, as a
matter of fact, which started in 1919 a sustained movement to
reduce international double taxation. The active direction of
this work was later assumed by the League of Nations.
The first step in the league’s campaign was a careful analysis of
the economic fundamentals of the problem prepared by Professor
Bruins of Holland, Senator Einaudi of Italy, Sir Josiah Stamp of
England and Professor Seligman of Columbia University. Their
report was published under the date of April 5, 1923. Subse
quently, the whole problem was studied at a general meeting of
government experts on double taxation and tax evasion, and
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their report was published in October, 1928. It contained,
among other things, three model bilateral conventions, Ia, Ib, and
Ic, for the use of states wishing to reduce double taxation by
treaty. Three drafts were thought to be necessary because of the
different types of fiscal systems existing in various countries.
Several treaties have since been drawn along the lines of these
model conventions.
It was apparent, however, that a more complete study of the
problem was needed and, largely through the efforts of the late
Dr. T. S. Adams of Yale, a grant of $90,000 was obtained from the
Rockefeller Foundation to finance a thorough investigation.
Mitchell B. Carroll, former special attorney in the United States
treasury department, was appointed to direct the inquiry. The
results of this study have since been published in five volumes.
The first three volumes contain descriptions of the tax systems of
23 countries and three American states, written by the tax ad
ministrators or experts in each country or state. These descrip
tions, naturally, will soon be out of date as to details, but they
give a good picture of general fiscal policies which will probably
be fairly permanent. Volume IV contains Mr. Carroll’s sum
mary of the whole survey, and volume V contains my own study
of some of the accounting aspects of allocation.
The survey made by the League of Nations reveals a substan
tial agreement among the authorities of the several nations on a
number of important points. It is generally agreed, for instance,
that business income should be taxed only in those countries in
which permanent establishments of an enterprise are located, and
the term “permanent establishment” has been defined with
considerable care. It is generally agreed, moreover, that the
rental of land, royalty on mines and other income definitely re
lating to land should be taxed in the country in which the land is
situated. Serious difficulties still exist, however, between debtor
and creditor countries with respect to the taxation of interest,
dividends and the like.
After the conclusion of the survey by the League of Nations, the
fiscal committee adopted a draft convention for the allocation of
business income between states for the purposes of taxation.
This convention and the three model bilateral conventions previ
ously mentioned provide the machinery for making allocations of
practically all types of taxable income between countries which are
disposed to eliminate double taxation by agreement. Several
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bilateral treaties have already been made, and it is to be hoped
that the latest draft convention on the allocation of income will
likewise be favorably received. If the countries of the world suc
ceed in reaching some workable solution to the more pressing
problems of currency stabilization and tariffs, it is not improbable
that they will turn their attention again to the problems of double
taxation.
Even though the proposed draft convention were generally
adopted, some difficult problems of allocation would still remain.
The convention states the principle which is to govern allocations
of business income, but does not prescribe methods in detail.
The draft convention definitely adopts the principle of separate
accounting as standard and provides optional methods to be used
only when the separate accounts of the permanent establishments
of an enterprise in one of the contracting states do not fairly
reflect the income allocable thereto.
Article 3 (draft convention adopted for the allocation of busi
ness income between states for purposes of taxation):
“If an enterprise with its fiscal domicile in one contracting
state has permanent establishments in other contracting states,
there shall be attributed to each permanent establishment the net
business income which it might be expected to derive if it were
an independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar ac
tivities under the same or similar conditions. Such net income
will, in principle, be determined on the basis of the separate ac
counts pertaining to such establishment. Subject to the pro
visions of this convention, such income shall be taxed in accord
ance with the legislation and international agreements of the
state in which such establishment is situated.
“The fiscal authorities of the contracting states shall, when
necessary, in execution of the preceding paragraph, rectify the
accounts produced, notably to correct errors or omissions, or
to re-establish the prices or remunerations entered in the books
at the value which would prevail between independent persons
dealing at arm’s length.
“If an establishment does not produce an accounting showing
its own operations, or if the accounting produced does not cor
respond to the normal usages of the trade in the country where
the establishment is situated, or if the rectifications provided for
in the preceding paragraph can not be effected, or if the taxpayer
agrees, the fiscal authorities may determine empirically the busi
ness income by applying a percentage to the turnover of that
establishment. This percentage is fixed in accordance with the
nature of the transactions in which the establishment is engaged
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and by comparison with the results obtained by similar enter
prises operating in the country.
“If the methods of determination described in the preceding
paragraphs are found to be inapplicable, the net business income
of the permanent establishment may be determined by a com
putation based on the total income derived by the enterprise from
the activities in which such establishment has participated.
This determination is made by applying to the total income
coefficients based on a comparison of gross receipts, assets, number
of hours worked or other appropriate factors, provided such
factors be so selected as to ensure results approaching as closely as
possible to those which would be reflected by a separate account
ing.” (League Document C.399.M.204. 1933, II, A(F/Fiscal
76).)
If the separate accounts are unsatisfactory, the tax authorities
are expected to try, first, to rectify or to adjust the accounts and,
failing this, to determine the income empirically by the percentage
of turnover or gross profits method. Only as a last resort are
they to make a fractional apportionment of the entire net income
of the enterprise.
The soundness of the procedure here outlined is generally recog
nized throughout the world, not only by accountants but also by
business men, lawyers and tax officers. The method of separate
accounting effectually eliminates the reporting of a single item of
income in more than one jurisdiction; it simplifies the preparation
and the verification of tax returns, since only the figures of a
single establishment need be considered; and, if honestly used, it
produces more accurate results by reducing the zone of uncertainty
which is inevitably present in all apportionments. General ap
portionment, on the other hand, places upon international enter
prises the burden of reporting on their world-wide business to
many countries with different currencies and laws. The results,
moreover, can not be accurate. All apportionment fractions
allocate profits in a uniform ratio to all establishments of an
enterprise, and yet if there is one certainty it is that the profits of
different establishments do vary—in rate as well as in amount.
Certain establishments may earn profits while others suffer losses,
but an apportionment fraction always assigns profits to all alike.
During the league’s investigation of allocation methods, services
of great value were rendered by a special committee on inter
national double taxation of the American Institute of Account
ants, with which it was my pleasure to be unofficially associated.
It was the primary concern of this committee to prevent the
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adoption of unsound principles of allocation. It was not particu
larly concerned with detailed methods. The principle which the
committee recommended in its statement of April 25, 1931, how
ever, has now been adopted and the time for the development and
refinement of methods is at hand. Research on the theoretical
aspects of the problem is needed, but even more important is the
practical application of methods already known. In the final
analysis, each enterprise must be treated as an individual problem.
The concept of taxing each separate establishment as if it were
an independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities
is simple enough, but the application of the principle raises a host
of difficulties. It will not be easy to install systems of accounting
adequate to convince doubting tax officers that intra-company
transactions are priced as if they were made “at arm’s length.”
The evidence, nevertheless, indicates that even now, without the
benefit of the draft convention, separate accounts which are
honestly and fairly set up are rather generally acceptable to tax
authorities.

The Allocation Problem Within the United States

The problems of double taxation and allocation, however, are
not restricted to the international field. They arise in the great
est profusion within the United States. To most taxpayers and
accountants, indeed, the domestic problems are apt to over
shadow the international ones, especially since foreign trade has
dwindled to a mere trickle. Some twenty-six states now have
income-tax laws, and, of these, twenty-four tax corporate net in
comes. Because additional states are adopting the income tax
almost every year, the magnitude of the problems to be faced
should be evident.
The internal situation is affected by two important factors not
present in the international sphere: namely, the practice of doing
business with little regard for state lines, and the federal form of
government under which presumably sovereign states are bound
by a constitution as interpreted by the supreme court. The first
factor makes allocation difficult because the economic relation
ships between states have become both numerous and intricate;
the second impedes the process of adjustment which would cer
tainly occur if the power of taxation were centralized in the na
tional government and might occur if the states had treaty-mak
ing powers.
205

The Journal of Accountancy

The personal income-tax statutes, with only one or two excep
tions, follow the federal law and levy a tax on all income originat
ing within the state and on the entire income of residents, regard
less of origin. If this practice continues as additional states adopt
the income tax, the burden of double taxation will materially in
crease. The corporate income tax, however, applies as a rule only
to income having its origin within the state. Only three or four
states, Arkansas, North Carolina, South Carolina, and possibly
Mississippi, have provisions under which domestic corporations
may be taxed on their entire net incomes from sources both within
and without the state. Every state law levying a tax on corpo
rate net incomes, however, must provide some means for making
allocations, and it is this problem which will now be considered.
In the United States general apportionment has been by far the
most popular method of allocation. Most of the states, however,
are willing to accept returns based on a separate accounting if the
taxpayer can show that his accounts do reasonably reflect the
income having its origin within the state. The prevalent use of
apportionment fractions is due not so much to a general preference
for this method as it is to the lack of any other that can be gener
ally applied. A number of tax administrators prefer the method
of separate accounting in theory, but the flow of business across
state lines makes its use difficult and in some cases impossible.
Apportionment fractions have been introduced, therefore, as a
matter of administrative necessity. While these fractions will
not, except by coincidence, allocate the income of any given corpo
ration accurately to the various states in which it is earned, they
will, if uniform, effect a reasonable apportionment on the average.
Let me emphasize the point—they can be made to operate reason
ably on the average, but they can not be made to produce accurate
allocations of the incomes of individual enterprises. This fact,
in the light of recent supreme court decisions, is of considerable
importance.
Various committees of the National Tax Association have de
voted much time to the search for an ideal apportionment frac
tion. All apportionment fractions, however, merely serve to cut
the Gordian knot of complex economic relationships; therefore, in
the theoretical sense there can be no such thing as an ideal frac
tion. The best fraction is the one which most nearly meets the
following practical qualifications:
1. Uniformity.
206

The Campaign Against Double Taxation

2. Reasonableness.
3. Simplicity and ease of administration.
4. Constitutionality.
As a means of eliminating double taxation, uniformity is by far
the most important. Though the importance of uniformity has
long been recognized, until recently little progress had been made
toward securing it. There is, however, one formula which stands
a fair chance of general adoption, namely, the Massachusetts
formula. It has been used with general satisfaction to both tax
payers and the state for over ten years. Five states have already
adopted it, and six others are using fractions which do not differ
greatly in result. The formula may be stated thus:
Mass. tangibles
Mass. payrolls
-------------- +-----------------Total tangibles---- Total payrolls

Mass. sales
------------—
Total sales

Allocable
net income

Mass.
income

In arriving at the amount of allocable net income, the income re
ported on the federal tax return is adjusted for differences between
federal and state definitions of taxable income and for such items
as interest, dividends and capital gains which are allocated di
rectly to sources within and without the state.
This formula takes a middle ground between the extreme frac
tions which would apportion the total income on the basis of
tangible property alone, as in Connecticut, or on the basis of sales
alone, as in Tennessee. It is simple, easy to administer and rea
sonable on its face. Tangible property and payrolls within and
without the state can be easily determined. The sales factor
may offer some difficulty in this respect, but apparently it must be
included for political reasons. The general adoption of the
Massachusetts formula would unquestionably constitute an im
portant advance in the campaign to eliminate double taxation.
Were it not for the constitution and the United States supreme
court, it might be feasible to concentrate all effort into the attempt
to secure uniform methods of apportionment among the states.
The apportionment of the net income reported to the federal
government is so much simpler than separate accounting that it
might well be preferred by taxpayers, as well as tax officers, if
uniform methods were once introduced. The Supreme Court,
however, in Hans Rees Sons Co. v. North Carolina, 51 S. Ch. 385,
has ruled that no apportionment, no matter how fair the fraction
may be in its general application, will stand in any individual
case in which the taxpayer can prove that the income actually
207
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originating within a state is less than that apportioned thereto by
the fraction. This rule is perfectly sound, but nevertheless it
places the states in a difficult position. They can not depend en
tirely on apportionment fractions because of the rule. They can
not compel all returns to be made on the basis of separate ac
counts because such accounts simply are non-existent in most
cases. And if they accept returns based on either a general ap
portionment or a separate accounting, the taxpayers will naturally
take the more favorable option and an unascertainable amount of
corporate net income will avoid state income taxes altogether.
The position of the accountant, however, is reasonably clear.
If the statutory method of apportionment in any state allocates
to that state substantially more than the net income actually
earned therein, he should prepare the tax return on the basis of a
separate accounting for the establishment operating within the
state. In so doing, the accountant will not only be serving the
interests of his client but he will also be contributing something
toward a final solution of the problems of allocation. The pro
fession should not, and we believe does not, condone the use of
biased accounts or other devices to evade the payment of a rea
sonable tax, but certainly it could not be a violation of even the
strictest code of ethics to insist on reporting the taxable income
actually derived from operations within a given state.
The term “separate accounting” is somewhat vague and does
not refer to any particular method. It carries the implication
that the different branches or divisions of an enterprise are to be
treated as nearly as possible like independent business units. To
the author, however, separate accounting is simply a method for
determining the income attributable to particular establishments
with a maximum of direct allocation and a minimum of apportion
ment. In other words, it is place accounting based on direct
charges and credits for goods and services given and received.
This requires the use of quoted market prices and other independ
ent criteria wherever possible as means of reducing or eliminating
the amount of income or expense which would otherwise have to
be divided by apportionment.
Items which can be specifically assigned to one particular state
are rentals, royalties, interest and dividends received, capital
gains on property which has a fixed situs, etc. There is another
class of income which can be specifically assigned: namely, income
from ventures not directly connected with the principal business
208
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being carried on in two or more states. It has been held, for in
stance, that where one company owns and operates two distinct
lines of railroad, one within and the other without the state, the
state can not apply its allocation formula to the entire net income
of the company, but must tax only the income of the line within
the state. (Piedmont & N. R. Co. v. Query, 56 F. (2d) 172.)
Likewise, in the case of Palmolive Company v. Conway, 43 F. (2d)
226, it was held that Wisconsin could tax a fair share of the profits
from the manufacture and sale of soap, partly within and partly
without the state, but could tax no part of the profits of an ad
vertising agency which the company maintained entirely without
the state.
After all possible items have been directly allocated in any given
case, the remaining net income will be only that amount which in
the language of the courts is ascribable to a unitary business.
Such income is a true joint product of operations in two or more
states. Even this income can, however, be directly allocated by
separate accounting where quoted market prices are available for
the product in the different stages of production and distribution.
This contention is supported by at least three decided cases:
Standard Oil Co. v. Thorensen, 29 F. (2d) 708, North Dakota;
Standard Oil Co. v. Wis. Tax Comm., 197 Wis. 630; 223 N. W. 85;
Buick Motor Co. v. Milwaukee, 43 F. (2d) 385, Wisconsin.
The evidence in the two oil company cases showed that the
profits earned on sales in each of the states could be determined
accurately by charging current market prices for oil to the dis
tributing branches. The courts held that the states could there
fore tax no part of the profits due to the functions of producing or
refining. They could not, in other words, apply an allocation
fraction to total company income. The results in the Buick case
were similar though the details were different. The manufactur
ing company in Michigan had organized a wholly owned sales
company which had agreed to handle the distribution of Buick
automobiles throughout the world for a fixed annual profit which
was merely nominal in amount. Since Wisconsin’s apportioned
share of this profit was clearly unreasonable as the taxable profit
on the sale of several million dollars’ worth of automobiles, the
tax commission audited the accounts of the distributing agency
within the state and found that the amount of profit from Wis
consin operations could be determined by charging cars to the
agency at regular dealer prices. The commission found, more
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over, that the company actually made the charges on this basis in
its own accounting and arbitrarily reduced the profit to the agreed
amount by adjustments at the end of each year. Needless to say,
the court upheld the tax commission in its determination. These
cases make it clear that the courts will compel, or at least have
compelled, tax commissions to recognize separate determinations
of profit when apportionment is manifestly unjust to the tax
payer. They will also uphold an assessment based on an exami
nation of the separate accounts of a branch where it is clear that
only thus can a proper allocation of income be made.
The question still remains, however, whether allocations can be
made by separate accounting if there are no quoted market prices
or recognized dealer prices. In my opinion, allocations by ac
counting methods can still be made in many instances. To illus
trate, let us suppose that a Rhode Island manufacturing company
effects sales through branches in Massachusetts. If it bills its
product to these branches at manufacturing cost, including normal
factory overhead, it is obvious that the profit allocable to Massa
chusetts can not exceed the gross profit on Massachusetts sales
less the operating expenses of the branches in Massachusetts. If
nothing remains, no profit can properly be assigned to Massa
chusetts even though the enterprise as a whole is profitable and
would, under the apportionment method, have to pay a sub
stantial tax in Massachusetts. The state tax commission would,
no doubt, recognize this fact. If a profit remains, however, after
deducting the Massachusetts expenses, only part of it should be
taxed there. The other portion represents the so-called manu
facturing profit attributable to operations in Rhode Island.
This problem of making a separate determination of manufac
turing profit and selling profit is a fascinating one. Unfortunately
it can never be completely solved, for profit, after all, is the result
of the manufacture and the sale of goods, not the result of either
function alone. Profit of this kind must be apportioned unless an
intermediate price is fixed on the open market or by the customary
margins allowed to independent dealers. In making this ap
portionment, however, it is not necessary to apportion the entire
net income of the business. A much more accurate apportion
ment can be made on the basis of the component elements enter
ing into the ultimate selling price of the goods. Let us suppose
that the Rhode Island Manufacturing Company sold $1,000,000
worth of goods through its branches in Massachusetts, and an210
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other $1,000,000 worth through its branches in Wisconsin. A
careful analysis of these sales, we may assume, reveals the follow
ing facts:
Sales.................................................... ........
Less cost of materials....................... ........

Mass. sales
$1,000,000
300,000

Wis. sales
$1,000,000
300,000

Value added in manufacture........... ........

$ 700,000

$ 700,000

Conversion cost................................. ........
Distribution cost............................... ........

$ 400,000
200,000

$ 400,000
400,000

Total operating costs....................... ........

$ 600,000

$ 800,000

Net profit (loss)................................ ........

$ 100,000

($ 100,000)

Since two-thirds of the operating costs assignable to the goods
sold through Massachusetts branches were attributable to the
manufacturing function and one-third to the selling function, it
seems entirely fair to allocate two-thirds of the profit, or $66,667,
to Rhode Island and one-third, or $33,333, to Massachusetts, as
suming that all distribution costs were incurred in Massachusetts.
Whether the loss on Wisconsin sales should be divided equally
between the factory and the sales branches or assigned entirely to
the state of sale is a moot question. It is clear, however, that no
profit whatever should be allocated to Wisconsin. Paradoxically
enough, the Massachusetts formula, and other general apportion
ment fractions as well, would ordinarily assign more profit to
Wisconsin than to Massachusetts. The sales were identical,
tangible property may well have been the same, and salaries
and wages in Wisconsin almost certainly exceeded those in
Massachusetts since the cost of distribution in Wisconsin was
twice as high.
The suggested method for apportioning the joint profit of two
or more establishments on the basis of operating costs applicable
to the goods jointly handled, thus has one important advantage
over all general apportionment fractions. It can allocate profits
to some branches and losses to others closely in accordance with
actual results, while all general apportionment formulae neces
sarily spread profits evenly over all territories. It does, however,
require a first-class system of cost accounting, while the other
formulae may be applied to the figures supplied by almost any
general accounting system.
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In conclusion, the present situation with respect to allocation
may be briefly summarized as follows: (a) The method of separate
accounting has been definitely adopted by the League of Nations
after a far-reaching study of conditions and methods throughout
the world; (b) general apportionment on the basis of statutory
formulae is still the prevailing method in use by American states
having corporate income-tax laws; (c) but the supreme court of
the United States has sustained the right of a taxpayer to make a
return on the basis of a separate accounting whenever a statutory
fraction results in the allocation of more income to the taxing state
than was actually earned therein. The possibilities of separate
accounting as a method of allocation thus merit further investi
gation. If accountants succeed in developing and applying satis
factory methods for the direct allocation of income, they will have
contributed much toward the reduction of the present burden of
double taxation.
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